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科技感十足的人

   文章来源: 科学传播局    发布时间: 2019-12-11 17:22:40|八一网管家婆彩图新版   【字号:         】

  

  A conversation with Matt Farwell, author of “American Cipher: Bowe Bergdahl and the U.S. Tragedy in Afghanistan” (Penguin Press, 2019).

  The same day in June 2009 that Bowe Bergdahl, a 23-year-old private first class from Sun Valley, Idaho, walked off his military outpost in Paktika, Afghanistan, Sgt. Matt Farwell received the news that a friend with whom he served in 2007 had overdosed on opioids at his home in Alabama. On the ground in Afghanistan, the Army mobilized a weekslong search for the missing soldier. Back in the United States, the service denied Farwell’s friend a military burial because he had a less-than-honorable discharge for drug use — a habit Farwell says was a result of his deteriorating mental health following their tour in Afghanistan. Farwell and three other soldiers attended the funeral in uniform and delivered an American flag to their friend’s family, since the Army wouldn’t. “I was still reeling from that when I heard a soldier had gone missing in Afghanistan,” Farwell says. “For the past 10 years, I think I channeled a lot of that grief into interest — to the point of obsession — with the Bergdahl story.”

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  Within hours of walking away, Bergdahl was captured by the Taliban, and he was brutally tortured for nearly five years before being returned to the United States. Seven months after Bergdahl disappeared, Farwell’s older brother, Chief Warrant Officer Gary Marc Farwell, was killed in a helicopter crash in Germany. One of Farwell’s last acts as a soldier was to escort his brother’s body home to be buried in eastern Idaho, close to his wife’s family. He separated from the Army shortly after, without any plan for what to do next. “Four and a half years in the Army, including 16 months as an infantryman in eastern Afghanistan, provided plenty of skills with no legal application in the civilian world,” Farwell wrote in 2011 for the At War blog. “It was, however, wonderful preparation for being homeless.” He tried college but dropped out of two different schools. He spent time in a mental hospital. He drifted to California, where he ran out of money, all while trying to hide from the “ugliness of violent, unpredictable death” he had experienced during his deployment.

  Over time Farwell’s unrelenting infatuation with Bergdahl’s story helped to propel him out of his own self-destruction. He worked on a profile of Bergdahl with Michael Hastings that was published in Rolling Stone in June 2012. Two years later Bergdahl became the linchpin of an American foreign-policy decision after he was released in a prisoner exchange negotiated by the Obama administration, which traded him for five Taliban detainees being held at Guantánamo Bay. The media coverage of the prisoner swap turned the soldier into a household name. Bergdahl morphed into a singular figure onto which Americans projected their resentment of the never-ending war in Afghanistan. He had abandoned his fellow soldiers. The Army’s search for him had put people at unnecessary risk, and at least three service members were wounded during attempted rescue missions. Why were we negotiating with terrorists to get him back in the first place? Even Donald Trump publicly voiced his opinion of Bergdahl during his election campaign, calling Bergdahl a “dirty rotten traitor.” The denunciations “fed into the worst instincts of the military, the media and the public,” says Farwell, who was disgusted by the response, but also motivated to get the story right.

  The book covers multiple presidential administrations. How have the policy failures of past presidents affected the war in Afghanistan?

  When it comes to Afghanistan policy, there are no blameless, or bloodless, hands among any of the American presidents, Democrat or Republican — and this goes back even further than Carter: in fact, to Eisenhower pumping billions into an Idaho-based construction company tasked with creating dams and towns called “Little America” in southern Afghanistan. One of the most striking things when examining the continuum of what The Onion aptly called “the quagmire-building effort in Afghanistan” in 2009 is when you realize how completely bipartisan it was and is.

  The failure we now see in that country is an American failure. Jimmy Carter initiated the gigantic covert action campaign that used the C.I.A. to train the fathers of the men we now fight. Ronald Reagan expanded the program. George H.W. Bush abandoned the country after the Soviets left. Bill Clinton ignored the Taliban and decided not to kill bin Laden. The Sept. 11 attacks happened, and George W. Bush invaded Afghanistan to get bin Laden and topple the Taliban, even though the hijackers were largely from Saudi Arabia and got their best training in Miami, Phoenix and San Diego. Bush forgot about the war after invading Iraq, and then Barack Obama came in and expanded the Afghan war to cover his political flanks on withdrawal in Iraq. The sad litany of failure can’t easily be pinned on any one administration or political party, or even one American institution, but is visible to me every time I go for an appointment at my local veterans’ hospital and see broken men and women.

  Do you think the American public’s resentment toward Bergdahl has dissipated with time?

  The hatred of Bergdahl was unwarranted and unfair. We all really failed. As a country, we were bullies. The nation, goaded on by a media with a short attention span and a love of artificial controversy, unfairly projected a lot of the discomfort in the collective American unconsciousness about the war in Afghanistan onto Bergdahl. We didn’t do that to Robert Bales, who walked off his base twice and murdered 16 innocent people. After Vietnam, the Pentagon learned more about winning the public relations fight than the battlefield fight.

  I hope the book will show people that all the men and women who fought and sacrificed in Afghanistan are human beings, not the caricatures that soldiers are often made out as. They’re human beings who form a tiny minority of Americans who bear the costs of this war and pass it on to their children and their families.

  Do you think that Bergdahl’s actions in 2009 were the result of a greater systemic failure within the Army?

  I’m not looking to excuse what Bergdahl did. I’m looking to try to explain why he did it, and why it matters. No one made Bergdahl walk off the base besides Bergdahl. He did something that, as a former soldier, bugs the hell out of me, something I never did: He walked away. He pleaded guilty to the desertion charge against him. The Army, from Bergdahl’s immediate leadership up the chain to its commander in chief, all share in his failure. If Bergdahl and the Army failed this badly, that indicates a larger failure within the American society that put them in that situation to begin with. As the wars dragged on, fewer and fewer Americans wanted to fight in them, and the Army was having trouble making its recruiting goals and had serious problems with attrition at every rank. So they lowered the bar to enlist — admitting felons, giving waivers to the mentally ill, lowering intelligence and physical standards — to keep their numbers up and keep get fresh bodies into the meat grinder in Afghanistan.

  The book examines the American government’s hostage-negotiation policies, and it ends with some reforms that created an interagency hostage-recovery unit under the Obama administration in June 2015. Why did it take so long for these reforms to happen, and are they enough?

  This isn’t a bug in American policy, it’s a feature we pretend doesn’t exist. It took a case like Bergdahl’s — in which you have an American soldier as the pawn — for people to sit up and notice that the system was broken. For almost five years, Bergdahl, normally under the jurisdiction of the American military, was held in Pakistan, an ostensibly allied country, where only the C.I.A. was allowed to operate, and they had bigger fish to fry than Bergdahl. The F.B.I. was claiming that because it was a kidnapping, it was their case, but they lacked the resources to resolve it. The State Department saw it as a way to open wider negotiations and somehow regain relevance in a conflict they had been largely iced out of. Only when Lt. Col. Jason Amerine, who had been one of the first Green Berets into Afghanistan, decided to force the issue — a moment of great integrity at great personal sacrifice — were politicians forced to sit up and take notice and make changes. Is it enough? Probably not. Sweeping policy changes will never be enough for Americans with loved ones still in captivity overseas, and there are plenty of those still.

  What will be lasting impact of the Bergdahl case on the military?

  I hate to say it, but most likely very little. There are some legal precedents that were set, and it had its ripples on the war; one that is never talked about is how Bergdahl passed along actionable intelligence and lessons learned from captivity to the appropriate military and intelligence authorities. That had a lasting impact, the kind that can be measured in drone-strike dates and casualties on a timeline: A lot of the Haqqani network’s leadership was killed by C.I.A. drones following Bergdahl’s repatriation. But how do we expect the military to learn from this, if we have trouble doing it as individuals and as a society? Acknowledging that someone like Bergdahl, whom the American public once loudly proclaimed a traitor and tried to further imprison, did more than his fair share to dismantle the terror network that held him captive in an allied country is a really uncomfortable thing to do if you’re wedded to a narrative about the war, so for the military it is better just to sweep it all under the rug post-court-martial and forget about it.

B:

  

  八一网管家婆彩图新版【一】【路】【上】,【颜】【子】【衿】【回】【去】【的】【时】【候】【脸】【上】【都】【是】【一】【副】【非】【常】【开】【心】【的】【样】【子】 【脸】【上】【的】【笑】【容】【是】【怎】【么】【也】【收】【不】【住】 【可】【是】,【相】【对】【比】【之】【下】【身】【边】【的】【夜】【寒】【麟】【就】【没】【有】【那】【么】【的】【开】【心】【了】,【脸】【上】【的】【表】【情】【那】【叫】【一】【个】【臭】【呀】 【一】【开】【始】【的】【时】【候】,【颜】【子】【衿】【是】【没】【有】【发】【现】【夜】【寒】【麟】【的】【奇】【怪】【的】 【可】【是】,【最】【后】【的】【时】【候】,【颜】【子】【衿】【还】【是】【发】【现】【了】,【一】【看】【见】【夜】【寒】【麟】【那】【个】【黑】【黑】【的】【脸】,【颜】【子】【衿】【微】

【人】【证】【物】【证】【俱】【全】,【凌】【绩】【鸣】【自】【己】【也】【不】【辩】【解】【了】,【魏】【积】【安】【封】【存】【好】【状】【纸】【与】【供】【词】,【进】【宫】【求】【见】【卫】【枳】。 【卫】【枳】【看】【了】【状】【纸】【与】【凌】【绩】【鸣】【亲】【自】【画】【押】【的】【供】【词】【后】,【皱】【了】【皱】【眉】,【厌】【恶】【道】:“【革】【除】【凌】【绩】【鸣】【左】【佥】【都】【御】【史】【一】【职】,【永】【不】【录】【用】!” “【臣】【遵】【命】。”【卫】【枳】【得】【处】【置】【就】【是】【魏】【积】【安】【想】【要】【的】,【他】【拿】【着】【罢】【免】【凌】【绩】【鸣】【的】【口】【谕】【出】【了】【皇】【宫】,【心】【里】【爽】【快】【极】【了】。 【临】【近】【永】

【穆】【琛】【这】【一】【段】【时】【间】【都】【是】【小】【心】【翼】【翼】【的】,【原】【因】【无】【它】,【安】【岚】【怀】【孕】【了】。 【要】【问】【他】【什】【么】【心】【情】?【呵】~【有】【人】【要】【同】【他】【抢】【老】【婆】【了】,【他】【能】【有】【什】【么】【心】【情】。【而】【且】【一】【次】【就】【中】【什】【么】【的】【他】【觉】【得】【他】【可】【以】【去】【买】【彩】【票】【了】,【二】【十】【九】【年】【终】【于】【吃】【了】【一】【回】【肉】【的】【他】【还】【没】【体】【会】【个】【中】【滋】【味】【就】【要】【吃】【素】【了】。 【对】【于】【安】【岚】【怀】【孕】【的】【时】【候】【潘】【悦】【玲】【是】【最】【开】【心】【的】,【为】【啥】?【因】【为】【可】【以】【抱】【孙】【子】【了】【啊】!

  【呼】【啸】【的】【风】【在】【咆】【哮】。 【世】【界】【的】【暗】【面】,【在】【那】【深】【沉】【的】【世】【界】【之】【影】【中】,【这】【一】【刻】,【在】【阿】【帝】【尔】【的】【身】【躯】【之】【上】,【一】【枚】【紫】【色】【的】【碎】【片】【沉】【浮】,【从】【他】【的】【身】【上】【冲】【出】。 【这】【是】【世】【界】【意】【识】【的】【碎】【片】,【此】【刻】【其】【上】【散】【发】【出】【世】【界】【意】【识】【的】【波】【动】,【在】【从】【阿】【帝】【尔】【身】【躯】【之】【上】【冲】【出】,【其】【上】【蕴】【含】【的】【庞】【大】【意】【识】【径】【直】【向】【阿】【帝】【尔】【身】【上】【冲】【去】。 【轰】!! 【光】【阴】【碎】【落】,【浩】【瀚】【的】【力】【量】【在】【此】八一网管家婆彩图新版“【几】【位】,【这】【么】【做】【是】【不】【是】【有】【些】【不】【妥】?”【林】【端】【突】【然】【站】【出】【来】【说】【道】,【他】【心】【理】【很】【不】【爽】,【自】【己】【干】【了】【这】【么】【久】,【就】【落】【得】【个】【替】【被】【人】【打】【工】【的】【下】【场】【吗】,【还】【是】【不】【明】【不】【白】【的】【替】【别】【人】【打】【工】,【凭】【什】【么】,【为】【什】【么】。 【鸿】【钧】【吃】【惊】,【道】:“【杨】【戬】,【你】【觉】【得】***【不】【妥】?” “【我】【叫】【林】【端】!”【林】【端】【再】【次】【重】【申】,【鸿】【钧】【也】【只】【是】【点】【了】【点】【头】。 【林】【端】【继】【续】【说】【道】:“【这】【一】

  【时】【间】【过】【得】【很】【快】,【离】【第】【二】【轮】【的】【比】【赛】【仅】【剩】【三】【天】。 【因】【为】【采】【取】【的】【是】【现】【场】【直】【播】【的】【方】【式】,【所】【以】【在】【宣】【传】【上】,《【未】【来】【之】【子】》【节】【目】【组】【也】【是】【斥】【巨】【资】,【不】【仅】【是】【北】【极】【熊】【的】【相】【关】【平】【台】【上】【能】【看】【到】,【其】【它】【的】【渠】【道】【也】【经】【常】【能】【看】【到】【相】【关】【信】【息】。 【对】【选】【手】【来】【说】,【这】【是】【一】【件】【令】【她】【们】【兴】【奋】【又】【紧】【张】【的】【事】。 【录】【播】【的】【时】【候】,【可】【能】【还】【有】【缓】【冲】【余】【地】,【给】【她】【们】【失】【误】【的】【可】【能】

  【此】【时】【的】【乌】【龙】【它】【不】【敢】【说】【话】【了】,【因】【为】【它】【对】【布】【玛】【和】【兰】【琪】【已】【经】【产】【生】【了】【阴】【影】【了】,【普】【洱】【见】【此】【幸】【灾】【乐】【祸】【的】【大】【道】【一】【声】“【乌】【龙】,【没】【想】【到】【你】【也】【有】【这】【一】【天】【啊】,【活】【该】。” 【此】【时】【的】【乌】【龙】【已】【经】【被】【普】【洱】【的】【话】【给】【气】【住】【了】,【乌】【龙】【恼】【怒】【道】“【普】【洱】,【你】【刚】【才】【说】【什】【么】,【请】【你】【再】【说】【一】【遍】。” 【随】【后】【乌】【龙】【和】【普】【洱】【展】【开】【了】【火】【热】【化】【的】【争】【吵】【了】,【让】【的】【布】【玛】【和】【兰】【琪】【感】【到】【非】【常】【的】

  【张】【御】【在】【进】【入】【自】【身】【意】【识】【深】【处】【之】【后】,【他】【首】【先】【看】【到】【的】,【是】【两】【道】【由】【无】【数】【明】【亮】【璀】【璨】【星】【辰】【组】【成】【的】【银】【河】,【它】【左】【右】【相】【对】,【横】【贯】【虚】【宇】,【浩】【瀚】【无】【边】。 【他】【略】【略】【一】【讶】,【以】【为】【自】【己】【的】【观】【想】【图】【便】【是】【这】【等】【模】【样】。 【一】【般】【来】【说】,【因】【为】【修】【士】【本】【身】【是】【生】【灵】,【所】【以】【观】【想】【图】【都】【是】【活】【物】【具】【现】【为】【主】,【因】【为】【若】【是】【观】【想】【图】【太】【过】【高】【渺】【遥】【远】【的】【话】,【反】【而】【不】【利】【于】【修】【行】。 【不】【过】




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